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Pref ace 
Given the nature of this paper, I felt it necessary to 
explain my purpose in choosing the Rosenberg-Sobell trial as 
the subject of my senior honors thesis, and the methodology 
used in approaching this topic. My purpose in choosing this 
subject was twofold: First, I wanted to demonstrate the 
research and writing skills that I have developed during my 
four years as a student of history. This paper is intended 
to be a research paper. While I believe that there are some 
fascinating and controversial arguments discussed in this 
paper, I cannot claim to have originated any of these 
theories. Instead, I have attempted to combine the most 
significant points of many scholars into a paper that 
provides a relatively thorough understanding of the 
Rosenberg-Sobell trial. There is a host of outstanding books 
and journal articles on this topic, but most of the authors 
that write about the Rosenbergs conduct their research, 
develop their own theories, and tend to ignore the work that 
has already been done. The second reason for choosing this 
subject is personal. I enjoy studying the American legal 
system, and I selfishly chose this subject because I 
considered it fascinating. Furthermore, I believe this to 
be an important subject. The execution of the Rosenbergs 
represents a failure for not only the American legal system, 
but the entire system of American politics. In understanding 
how these events happened, one develops a better 
1 
understanding of the problems associated with majoritarian 
politics and the need to establish bulwarks against the 
evisceration of minority rights. Few historical events 
better teach that lesson. 
The methodology used in developing this paper was 
relatively simple. The research for this paper was done in a 
number of Southern California libraries, including UCLA, UC 
Riverside and Cal State San Bernardino. A plethora of books 
and articles exists on the subject of the Rosenbergs, but I 
decided against relying upon the bulk of that which was 
available. Most of the materials dealing with the legal 
history of the case were written in the mid- to late-1950s. 
While I used the most relevant materials from that time 
period, including the book entitled Was Justice Done?, 
published in 1956 and authored by Malcolm Sharp, I felt it 
unnecessary to read all the legal criticism written 
immediately after the trial. Most of the documents used in 
later works were not available until the 1960s or 1970s 
because the trial dealt with atomic secrets. Additionally, a 
lot of the literature on this topic deals exclusively with 
more restricted issues such as the effect of the trial on 
particular social movements or the Rosenberg family itself. 
Other material is very personal in nature, such as 
reproductions of the letters exchanged between family 
members. While I have included a small portion of that 
information in my paper, my thesis is almost exclusively 
concerned with the sentencing of the Rosenbergs, and the 
2 
interaction between the trial and the political dynamics of 
the 1950s. 
The method by which this paper was written was also 
relatively straightforward. Rather than separating 
historical events into subject areas such as family-related 
events, court-related events , media-related events, etc., I 
chose to discuss these events chronologically. I believe 
that this method of organizing the paper better allows the 
reader to understand the conviction and execution of Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg. Finally, I dedicated the remainder of 
the paper to a more general criticism of those events and the 
actors involved. 
3 
Justice Frankfurter was not alone in viewing the case as 
the most disturbing in his court career •••• Lawyers on 
both sides of the case felt a deep misgiving they have 
never forgotten. The guilt or innocence of the 
defendants had nothing to do with their distress over 
the Court's conduct and that of the Justice Department. 
Nor was the worldwide fire of partisan fervor on both 
sides the cause of their dismay. It was, rather, the 
spectacle of the Supreme Court of the United States 
becoming politicized before their eyes, with no one 
having the will or courage to stop it. Justice was 
rushed. Proper consideration of matters of the utmost 
importance was not allowed.1 
On June 19, 1953, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were 
executed at Sing Sing prison in New York, having been 
convicted of conspiring to commit espionage on behalf of the 
Soviet Union. For nearly four decades, commentators have 
argued that irrespective of the guilt or innocence of the 
couple, the American system of justice failed to give the 
Rosenbergs a fair trial. In this paper, I will similarly 
argue that justice was not administered in the case of Julius 
and Ethel Rosenberg. In attempting to defend this position, 
I will focus primarily on the actors responsible for this 
miscarriage of justice: the team of prosecuting attorneys, 
Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the federal district of New York, 
and select members of the United States Supreme Court. I 
will also attempt to explain the factors that may or may not 
1 Joseph Sharlitt, Fatal Error: The Miscarriage of Justice that Sealed the 
Rosenbergs' Fate (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 7. 
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have contributed to the politicization of the Rosenberg 
trial, namely anti-communism, McCarthyism, and anti-Semitism. 
The goal of this paper is not to defend Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg as innocent, nor to denounce the severity of the 
sentence handed down by Judge Kaufman, but to prove that many 
representatives of the American legal system acted ignorantly 
and sometimes unethically in their attempt to prosecute or 
judge the Rosenbergs. Politics and the anti-Soviet fervor of 
the early 1950s served as obstacles to justice. 
In February 1939, Julius Rosenberg graduated from the 
City College of New York (CCNY) with a degree in electrical 
engineering. Four months later, he married his childhood 
sweetheart, Ethel Greenglass. Julius Rosenberg and Ethel 
Greenglass had both grown up in poverty on the East Side of 
New York City. It was in this poverty-stricken environment, 
especially during the chaos of the Great Depression, that 
Julius and Ethel would begin to question the economic and 
political system of America.2 Ethel Greenglass had long 
dreamed of performing as an opera singer, but she later 
trained as a stenographer. By 1940, Julius Rosenberg was 
working for the Army Signal Corps and Ethel Rosenberg was 
working in civil defense. Julius would lose this job in 
1945, having been the target of charges that he was a 
Communist sympathizer, and would begin working at the New 
York plant of the Emerson Radio Company. David Greenglass, 
2 Alvin B. Goldstein, The Unquiet Death of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (New York: 
Lawrence Bill and Canpany, 1975) , 13. 
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Ethel's brother, had enlisted in the United States Army at 
the outbreak of world War II, and was being trained in the 
operation of sophisticated machinery.3 In 1942, Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg moved into an apartment on Monroe Street in 
Knickerbocker Village in New York. It was from this 
apartment that the prosecuting attorneys would later contend 
that the Rosenbergs had directed the activities of Harry 
Gold, David Greenglass, and other persons arrested for 
stealing atomic secrets and passing them on to the Soviets.4 
Late in 1944, David Greenglass was relocated by the Army 
to New Mexico, where he began working as a machinist in the 
top secret atomic weapons research program at the Los Alamos 
laboratory. Julius Rosenberg later testified that it was 
during this time that he and his wife bought a console table 
at the Macy's department store in downtown New York City. 
Evelyn Cox, a woman who had occasionally worked as a cleaning 
person for the Rosenbergs in their apartment, also testified 
that she first saw the console table during this period. The 
prosecution would later enter photographs of this table into 
evidence before the district court, contending that this 
table had been hollowed out and used to house microfilm 
equipment.5 Max Elitcher of the Naval Ordinance Bureau would 
testify during the trial that in June 1944, he was first 
approached by Julius Rosenberg. He claimed that Rosenberg 
3 Goldstein, 7. 
4 Malcolm Sharp, Was Justice Done? The Rosenberg-Sobell Case (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1956), vii. 
5 Sharp, vii. 
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attempted to pressure him into engaging in espionage while 
working at the Navy Ordinance Bureau.6 Ruth Greenglass, the 
wife of David Greenglass, testified that during November and 
December of 1944, her brother-in-law Julius asked her to 
travel to Albuquerque and obtain information from her husband 
concerning the work occurring at Los Alamos. She claimed to 
have visited her husband in New Mexico, to have obtained 
sketches of some of the critical components of the atomic 
device, and to have returned this information to the 
Rosenbergs in New York before the end of the year.7 
Most of the crimes for which Julius and Ethel Rosenberg 
would be convicted six years later were supposed to have 
happened during the months of January to September 1945. The 
Greenglasses would both testify that, during the month of 
January, they furnished the Rosenbergs with information 
concerning the "lens mold" component of the atom bomb, and 
arranged for further espionage with a Philadelphia chemist 
named Harry Gold. David Greenglass also testified to having 
been provided with one half of a torn Jello box top by Julius 
during their meeting in New York.a The person with whom 
David Greenglass was to meet in New Mexico was to be carrying 
the other half of this box top. Greenglass further testified 
to having accompanied a Russian on an automobile ride through 
the streets of New York City.9 Greenglass drove his father's 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Sharp, vii. 
Sharp, vii. 
Sharp, viii. 
Sharp, viii. 
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car to some point on 1st Avenue between 42nd and 59th 
Streets, waited for Julius to bring the Russian to his car, 
and proceeded to drive around town for approximately twenty 
minutes while the Russian asked questions concerning the work 
at Los Alamos.10 This individual was later identified, 
during the district court proceedings, as Anatoli A. 
Yakovlev, a former vice-consul of the Soviet Consulate in New 
York City. Harry Gold and the Greenglasses testified during 
the trial to having met in Albuquerque during June 1945, and 
to having identified each other with matching halves of the 
Jello box top. David Greenglass provided Gold with 
additional information about the lens mold, and, in exchange, 
Gold gave Greenglass $50o.11 By September, the Greenglasses 
were to have provided the Rosenbergs with a "cross section 
sketch" of the atomic device itself and further explanations 
concerning the operation of the bomb. Ethel Rosenberg became 
directly involved when, as David Greenglass testified, she 
typed up this information into twelve pages of notes. Max 
Elitcher also testified that during the month of September, 
Julius Rosenberg tried for a second time to encourage him to 
provide naval secrets to the Soviets, but was again 
unsuccessfu1.12 
In 1946, Julius Rosenberg and David Greenglass financed 
the first of a succession of small businesses operating 
10 
11 
12 
Sharp, 28. 
Sharp, viii. 
Sharp, viii. 
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machine shop equipment. Rosenberg would continue to operate 
these businesses until his arrest in 1950, but at a great 
financial loss both to himself and the Greenglass family.13 
Late in 1950, both Anatoli Yakovlev and Klaus Emil Julius 
Fuchs, a German-born British scientist and an alleged contact 
of Harry Gold in the spying ring, left the United States. 
Yakovlev returned to the Soviet Union, never again to return 
to the U.S.; Fuchs left the U.S. for England.14 The 
Greenglasses testified to having seen the microfilming device 
built into the console table for the first and only time 
during the winter months of 1946. 
The case against the Rosenbergs began to unfold early in 
1950. Klaus Fuchs was arrested on February 3 in England with 
Allan Nun May, another British atomic scientist, and was 
later tried and convicted on the basis of his confession to 
having provided representatives of the Soviet Union with 
information about the atomic device being built as Los 
Alamos.15 Fuchs was sentenced to only fourteen years in 
prison, the maximum sentence allowed under British law for 
this type of crime, and May received a lighter sentence of 
only ten years.16 The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of 
the U.S. Congress admitted in April of 1951 that they 
considered the information disclosed to the Soviets by Fuchs 
13 Sharp, viii. 
14 Sharp, v111; Robert and Michael Meeropol, We Are Your Sons: The Legacy of Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg (Boston1 Houghton Miffin Canpany, 1970), xix. 
15 
16 
Meeropol, xix. 
Sharp, 3. 
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and May as more important than anything Greenglass admitted 
to transferring.17 David Greenglass was visited on an 
undetermined date in February by FBI agents, and was 
questioned about uranium missing from the Los Alamos project. 
On May 23, Harry Gold openly confessed to FBI agents that he 
had been the American contact for Fuchs and Yakovlev during 
the years of 1944 and 1945. On June 15, David Greenglass was 
arrested. He signed a written confession two days later for 
the Rosse office of the FBI, admitting that he was an 
accomplice of Gold's during 1945.18 Less than twenty four 
hours after the arrest of Greenglass, Julius Rosenberg was 
questioned by FBI agents about his business involvements with 
Greenglass, but he was not arrested at this time. It was at 
this point that the Rosenbergs retained Emanuel Bloch as 
their legal counse1.19 Ben Schneider, a professional 
photographer, testified that during the month of May or June, 
he had taken thirty six passport pictures for the Rosenbergs. 
Dr. George Bernhardt, a local physician, testified that he 
had been contacted by Julius Rosenberg at approximately this 
time concerning the inoculations needed for a trip to 
Mexico.20 The testimony of both persons was used by the 
prosecution to establish an attempt on the part of the 
Rosenberg family to flee the country during the days after 
the arrest of Gold and Greenglass. 
17 Sharp, 3. 
18 Meeropol, xix; Sharp, ix. 
19 Meeropol, xix. 
20 Sharp, ix. 
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Morton Sobel!, a friend and college classmate of the 
Rosenbergs, left with his family for Mexico on June 22, 
195o.21 Three days later, on June 25, North Korean armies 
invaded the South, forcing American soldiers into war on the 
Korean peninsula. Less than one year later, by the beginning 
of the Rosenberg-Sobel! proceedings, thousands of American 
soldiers had already died overseas. The activities of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), a 
Congressional subcommittee created in 1938, as well as other 
anti-communist organizations, seemed to take on added 
importance as a result of the Korean war. On July 17, Julius 
Rosenberg was arrested; Ethel Rosenberg was arrested on 
August 11. The Rosenbergs and David Greenglass were held on 
$100,000 bond each. The first of three indictments against 
the Rosenbergs was served on August 17, the last being served 
on January 31, 1951 in the New York Southern District, and 
operating as the basis for the tria1.22 Morton Sobell was 
arrested in his Mexico City apartment, "forcefully" deported 
by Mexican police on August 18, and left at the border in 
Laredo, Texas for American law enforcement officials.23 
Sobell and the Rosenbergs would spend seven to eight months 
in a federal jail before the start of their trial. On 
December 9, 1950, Harry Gold was sentenced to 30 years in 
21 
22 
23 
Meeropol, xix. 
Sharp, ix. 
Sharp, ix. 
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prison, the maximum prison sentence allowed under the 
Espionage Act of 1917. 
The arrest of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg devastated 
their apparently stable family situation. Their two sons, 
Robert and Michael, were ages four and eight respectively at 
the time of their parents' arrest. The children initially 
moved in with Tessie Greenglass, the mother of David and 
Ethel, but were transferred to the Hebrew Children's Home, a 
shelter in the Bronx, in November 195o.24 The children were 
again moved in June 1951, having been taken in by Sophie 
Rosenberg, Julius's mother, after she had recovered from an 
illness. In July 1952, during the long and emotionally 
devastating appeals process initiated by their parents' 
attorneys, the children were again displaced. They were 
moved to the home of Ben and Sonia Bach, friends of Julius 
and Ethel, in Toms River, New Jersey.25 Robert and Michael 
Rosenberg were moved back to New York City in December 1953, 
only a few months after having observed the execution of 
their parents by electrocution at the ages of six and ten. 
In September of 1954, they moved in permanently with Abel and 
Anne Meeropol. They were legally adopted by the Meeropols in 
February 1957, and took the name of their adoptive parents.26 
The trial against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and their 
co-defendant Morton Sobell began on March 6, 1951 in the 
24 
25 
26 
Meeropol, xix. 
Meeropol, xx. 
Meeropol, xxii-xxiii. 
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Federal Court House, Foley Square, New York. The three had 
been charged with conspiracy to commit espionage and were 
being prosecuted under Section 50 u. s. Code 32 of the 
Espionage Act of 1917. Julius Rosenberg had been charged 
with involvement in twelve overt acts of espionage, eleven of 
which involved atomic energy secrets.27 The prosecution 
contended that the Rosenbergs had persuaded David Greenglass 
to pass nuclear secrets to Anatoli A. Yakovlev, often 
referred to as "John" by Harry Gold. The twelfth charge 
against Julius Rosenberg involved nonatomic but classified 
naval secrets which Sobel!, under Julius Rosenberg's 
guidance, had supposedly obtained from Max Elitcher. 
Elitcher presented the only major testimony for the 
prosecution in proving this claim. Also, this was the only 
connection between Sobel! and the Rosenbergs or any charge of 
espionage.28 David and Ruth Greenglass, as well as Harry 
Gold and Max Elitcher, were the central figures in building 
the case for the prosecution.29 The prosecution put twenty-
three persons on the witness stand in total, but only these 
four persons could testify to any direct link between the 
Rosenbergs and an attempt to commit espionage, and none of 
the witnesses could testify to any direct link between the 
Rosenbergs and the Soviets. The other nineteen witnesses 
27 Opinion of the Court, 346 u.s. 283, 285. 
28 Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1984), 131. 
29 John Wexley, The JudgnED.t of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1977), xv. 
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were either character witnesses, testifying to the Communist 
tendencies of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, or were linked to 
specific events such as the purchase of the console table.30 
Under the Espionage Act of 1917, a trial to determine 
the guilt or innocence of an alleged perpetrator of espionage 
had to be conducted with jury recommendation, but the 
sentencing was to be left to the judge in charge of the 
proceedings. Section (b) of the relevant portion of the Act 
allowed the judge to impose one of two sentences for 
conspiracy to commit espionage in time of war: either 
imprisonment for not more than thirty years, or punishment by 
death. Ethel Rosenberg, despite being only tenuously linked 
to the actions of Sobell or her husband, could still be 
convicted and put to death under section (d) of the portion 
of the Espionage Act.31 Section (d) reads: "If two or more 
persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of 
such persons do any act to effect the object of conspiracy, 
each of the parties in such conspiracy shall be subject to 
the punishment provided for the offense which is the object 
of such conspiracy."32 Thus, if the prosecution was even 
able to prove that Ethel was aware of the actions of her 
husband, such as in typing some of his notes, she could be 
tried for the charge of conspiracy and suffer the same 
punishment as her husband. 
30 Goldstein, 39. 
31 Michael E. Parrish, "Cold War Justice1 The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs," 
American Historical Review 82 (1977)1 807-809. 
32 50 u.s.c. 32 (d). 
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The trial was held in Courtroom 110 of the Federal 
Courthouse. Presiding over the case was one of the youngest 
federal judges in the nation, Judge Irving R. Kaufman. The 
Rosenbergs• attorneys consisted of Emanuel Bloch and his 
father, Alexander. Gloria Agrin and Malcolm Sharp, a 
professor of law at the University of Chicago, joined the 
defense team during the appeals process. Howard Meyer served 
as counsel for Morton Sobell. At the prosecution table were 
U.S. Attorney Saypol, and his assistants Myles Lane, Roy M. 
Cohn, and James Kilsheimer III. Roy Cohn would later serve 
as counsel for the McCarthy Committee.33 From a panel of 
over 300 New Yorkers, a jury of eleven men and one woman was 
selected. It is disturbing to note that from a city whose 
ethnic makeup was composed of greater than 30 percent Jewish 
persons in 1951, not a single Jewish-American was placed on 
the jury.34 In fact, of the twelve persons selected, a 
substantial majority of the jurors were older, Caucasian men 
whose political views could unquestionably have been labeled 
conservative and strongly anti-communist.35 
On Thursday morning, March 8, 1951, the prosecution 
brought Max Elitcher, their first witness, to the stand. 
Elitcher, Morton Sobell, and Julius Rosenberg had graduated 
from CCNY in 1939 with degrees in electrical engineering, and 
had been relatively close friends while attending school. 
33 
34 
35 
Sharp, 20. 
Goldstein, 65. 
Goldstein, 65-66. 
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Elitcher had been contacted about his relationship with 
Rosenberg and Sobell by FBI agents Vincent Cahill and James 
O'Brien on July 20, 1950, while working at the Reeves 
Instrument Company in New York City.36 Elitcher told the FBI 
agents that he had been contacted twice after graduation by 
Rosenberg, first in June 1944 and later in September 1945. 
Elitcher said that, on both occasions, Julius asked many 
questions of him about his work with the Navy. Also, 
Elitcher told Cahill and O'Brien that Sobell had repeatedly 
contacted him, asking him in late 1939 to join the Young 
Conununist League and later to provide Rosenberg with naval 
secrets.37 Finally, Elitcher reported that he had driven to 
the home of Morton Sobell in July 1948, and had reason to 
believe that he had been followed by FBI agents. He told 
Sobell this, and Sobell inunediately demanded that Elitcher 
drive the two of them to a deserted waterfront street in New 
York City named Catherine Slip. Sobell removed a film case 
from his jacket pocket, left the car, and was gone for about 
15 to 20 minutes. The only connection between Rosenberg and 
this incident is that Catherine Slip is two blocks from 
Knickerbocker Village, the low-income project that was home 
to the Rosenbergs.38 
In retrospect, the testimony of Max Elitcher does not 
seem to be particularly damaging, but it was in fact 
36 
37 
Radosh, 132. 
Wexley, 261. 
38 Harold c. Urey, Was Justice Done? The Rosenberg-Sobel! Case (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1956, preface to book written by Malcolm Sharp), xvi; Wexley, 258. 
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instrumental to the decision against the Rosenbergs. 
Additionally, Elitcher was the only person that testified 
against Morton Sobel!, and he had no physical evidence to 
support his claims. On the basis of the unsubstantiated 
statements of one individual, Sobel! was found guilty by the 
jury and sentenced by Judge Kaufman to 30 years in prison, 
the maximum jail term allowed under the Espionage Act. 
The testimony of Elitcher suffered from three critical 
flaws. First, immediately before his involvement with the 
Rosenberg-Sobel! trial, Elitcher was himself being prosecuted 
for perjury. Elitcher, when applying for employment with the 
Naval Department, had sworn that he had never had any 
involvement with the Communist Party, yet in a 1948 KGB 
transmission, decoded by the FBI, Elitcher's name was 
mentioned in conjunction with a series of Communist 
organizations. Elitcher admitted while on the witness stand 
that he was testifying under the assumption that he would no 
longer be prosecuted on the perjury charge.39 In fact, the 
charges against Elitcher were never brought to fruition. 
Second, Elitcher testified that Rosenberg had asked him 
questions about his project, not that Rosenberg had asked 
Elitcher to spy on behalf of the Soviet Union. One engineer 
asking another engineer about his work seems to be a very 
normal question.40 Finally, even if Max Elitcher was telling 
the truth, and Julius Rosenberg had pressured Elitcher on two 
39 
40 
Urey, xvi. 
Wexley, 269. 
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occasions to disclose naval secrets, the disclosure of that 
information does not carry the same penalty as passing atomic 
secrets. Judge Kaufman based the death sentence for the 
Rosenbergs on the fact that it was atomic espionage, and thus 
particularly threatening to U.S. interests.41 
The court clerk called the second witness for the 
prosecution, David Greenglass, to the stand at 2:30 p.m. on 
Friday, March 9. Before the court adjourned for the weekend, 
Greenglass testified that as a teenager, he had overheard his 
sister Ethel and her friend Julius Rosenberg praising 
socialism on a number of occasions.42 The court resumed 
Monday morning, and David Greenglass began his oral testimony 
by discussing the drawings of the lens mold that he had given 
to Julius in January 1945 and Harry Gold in June 1945. 
Greenglass attempted to recreate these drawings while in 
court. His testimony was supported by Walter Koski, an 
expert on the high-explosive lens from the Los Alamos 
laboratory. Koski attempted to explain the difference 
between an explosion lens and an implosion lens. But, given 
the technical jargon involved in such an explanation, and the 
complexity of the subject, his efforts only confused most of 
the persons in the courtroom.43 Koski also testified that 
Exhibit 2, Greenglass's recreation of the drawing originally 
provided to Harry Gold, was a "substantially accurate 
41 
42 
43 
Urey, xix. 
Radosh, 181. 
Radosh, 185. 
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replica" of the lens mold used in the weapons dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
David Greenglass was brought back to the stand the next 
day, and he elaborated on the typing incident of September 
1945, claiming that Ethel had typed his handwritten notes and 
that Julius burned them in a frying pan as soon as she had 
finished. He concluded his statement by presenting one half 
of a Jello box top, which was submitted into evidence, and by 
testifying that he had seen the microfilming equipment stored 
inside the console table kept at the Rosenberg's apartment.44 
The Jello box top submitted before the court was not the 
original, but had been scissored in half by the prosecution 
as a prop.45 
Despite the credibility with which his testimony was 
initially received by the jury, there are a number of 
intuitive problems with the statements of David Greenglass. 
First, the Greenglasses testified that the console table had 
been "hollowed out" to make room for "a lamp to fit 
underneath it," and that it had been provided to the 
Rosenbergs by their Russian contact. But the console was 
found in the spring of 1953 by reporter Leon Sununit of the 
National Guardian while interviewing Julius's sister. Not 
only was Macy's able to identify it as their product, but the 
structure of the console had not suffered the damage 
44 
45 
Radosh, 193. 
Sharp, 20. 
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described by the Greenglasses.46 Judge Kaufman was unwilling 
to look at the table once it had been found.47 Second, the 
chronology of events as outlined by Greenglass portrays the 
Rosenbergs as essentially meaningless actors. According to 
Greenglass, he travelled two thousand miles to New York in 
September 1945 so that his sister could type twelve pages of 
notes and his brother-in-law could burn the evidence in a 
frying pan. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union 
would risk an operation of this magnitude by unnecessarily 
including two additional people; David Greenglass could have 
brought the paperwork directly to Yakovlev at the Soviet 
Consulate.48 Harry Gold testified to the fact that his 
Soviet contacts took extreme precautions when organizing 
meetings with American spies.49 Finally, Greenglass had a 
motive to perjure himself while on the witness stand. Julius 
had purchased David Greenglass's share of their machinery 
business in 1949, but had been unable to keep up with the 
monthly payments to his brother-in-law, creating financial 
havoc for the Greenglass family.SO Harold Urey described 
this financial dispute as a "serious business altercation," 
creating a large degree of animosity between Rosenberg and 
the Greenglasses.51 Additionally, both David and Ruth 
Greenglass had confessed to a crime that carried a maximum 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Urey, xxi. 
Sharp, 12-14. 
Urey, xxiv. 
Sharp, 86. 
Urey, xxii; Wexley, 290. 
Urey, xxvi. 
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penalty of death, and many of the actors involved in the 
crime had escaped to foreign nations. Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg were two of the few remaining persons that could be 
used as scapegoats for the entire affair. The Greenglasses 
had undoubtedly been advised of this fact by their 
attorneys.52 In fact, David Greenglass received a remarkably 
light sentence of fifteen years and Ruth Greenglass was never 
prosecuted, largely because they both participated in the 
trial against the Rosenbergs. As proof of the prosecution's 
leniency toward Greenglass, the Rosenbergs were also offered 
a lighter sentence up until the time of their death on the 
assumption that they could provide the FBI with the names of 
other persons involved in the spy ring and testify against 
those persons.53 
The testimony of Ruth Greenglass, the third witness for 
the prosecution, constituted little more than a partial 
regurgitation of her husband's testimony. Her idealistic 
affection for Soviet Communism and her respect for Julius 
Rosenberg quickly withered as she realized that Julius was 
not concerned with the financial status of G & R Engineering, 
the machinery business operated in conjunction with her 
husband.54 In an attempt to corroborate her husband, Ruth 
mentioned that the Rosenbergs, at the height of their 
involvement with the spy ring, had been spending upwards of 
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$SO to $7S per night entertaining persons that they planned 
later to involve in their efforts at espionage.SS This 
testimony serves further to weaken the credibility of the 
Greenglasses as witnesses against the Rosenbergs. In 194S, 
while an employee with the Emerson Radio Company, Julius 
Rosenberg was making less than $100 per week. His wife was 
not employed at the time, and the family was paying almost 
$Sl per month for rent on their apartment. Additionally, the 
family business was operating at a financial loss. Not only 
is it difficult to believe that the Rosenbergs could have 
afforded such festivities, but these activities would seem to 
have put the entire operation at risk, an endeavor that was 
supposed to be by its nature highly secretive.S6 
One of the most interesting developments of the trial 
occurred outside of the courtroom during the testimony of 
Ruth Greenglass. On March lS, 19Sl, as a result of an arrest 
warrant signed by Judge Kaufman, William Perl, a college 
friend of Julius Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, and Max Elitcher, 
was incarcerated. Irving Saypol had questioned Perl months 
earlier in connection with the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, but 
Perl contended that he never knew and thus did not remember 
either Rosenberg or Sobell from his days at CCNY.S7 Judge 
Goddard, a circuit court judge in the Second Federal 
District, had signed and sealed an indictment against William 
55 
56 
57 
Urey, xx. 
Urey, xxi. 
Sharp, 107~ Radosh, 202. 
22 
Perl on the grounds that he had perjured himself before 
saypol. Saypol brought the paperwork directly to Judge 
Kaufman on May 13. Kaufman unsealed the indictment, 
converted it to an arrest warrant, signed his name to the 
warrant, and resealed the document.SS Two days later, Perl's 
arrest was officially announced by J. Edgar Hoover himself .59 
The arrest was described in the opinion-editorial section of 
the New York Times, the title of the article reading 
"Columbia Teacher Arrested, Linked to 2 on Trial as Spies. 11 60 
This editorial was used by Saypol to present what he believed 
to be Perl's connection with Sobell and Rosenberg; Perl still 
refused to cooperate with the prosecution. William Perl was 
subsequently convicted for perjury, but not until May of 
1953, nineteen months after the end of the Rosenberg-Sobell 
tria1.6l John Wexley believes that the timing of this event, 
and the actions of all those involved, prove that this was 
"deliberate falsehood" and malicious "collusion" between 
Saypol, Kaufman, and Hoover.62 It is difficult to believe 
that the members of the jury successfully avoided both the 
radio and the newspaper when returning home on the night of 
May 15. unquestionably, "the jury was affected by the 
surrounding publicity."63 Emanuel Bloch, the lead attorney 
for the Rosenbergs, objected to the publication of the Perl 
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indictment during the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, but his 
objection was ignored by both Judge Kaufman and Judge Frank 
during the appeal. 
The next witness, Harry Gold, was described by the 
prosecutor as the "necessary link" in the case against the 
Rosenbergs.64 Taking the witness stand on the morning of 
March 15, his direct examination was conducted by Myles Lane, 
Saypol's senior assistant. Gold echoed the description given 
by David Greenglass of the events of June 1945 in 
Albuquerque.65 He presented a registration card from the 
Albuquerque Hilton Hotel in his name; it was dated June 3, 
1945, and was used as evidence of his meeting with Greenglass 
in New Mexico.66 When entered into evidence as Government 
Exhibit 16, a photostatic copy of the document was supplied 
to the court. Saypol claimed that the original was on its 
way to New York, but the original never arrived.67 Gold 
testified to numerous encounters with Anatoli Yakovlev, his 
Soviet contact, and discussed his involvement with Klaus 
Fuchs, but never said that he even knew either Ethel or 
Julius Rosenberg by name.68 
The testimony of Harry Gold suffered from a multitude of 
deficiencies. First, the credibility of Harry Gold as a 
witness is highly in doubt. Gold had already been convicted 
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of conspiring to comm.it espionage one year earlier, and was 
serving a thirty-year prison sentence. Additionally, Gold 
had testified four months prior to the Rosenberg-Sobell trial 
in another espionage case, this one against his former 
employer Abraham Brothman. It was disclosed during the 
course of that trial that Gold, over a period of years, had 
told a number of individuals the details of his personal 
life--that he was married with children, and had a brother 
who had died in world war II.69 Allen G. Schwartz, a former 
assistant district attorney in New York, described these 
statements as "fantasy." Gold had never married, had no 
children, and had no brother who had died in the war.70 
Second, the registration card presented before the court 
was arguably a forgery. Miriam and Walter Schneir contend 
that the original of the card, never presented before the 
court, contained a date-time-stamp error. The back of the 
card was stamped June 4, and the date-time-stamp would 
reflect the true date of registration. Yet Gold testified 
that he met with Greenglass on June 3.71 Also, the state of 
New Mexico required hotels to keep their registration cards 
on record for no more than three years, yet the card in 
question had been acquired more than five years after Gold 
had supposedly stayed at the Hilton. It seems highly 
improbable that Gold unknowingly stayed at the only hotel in 
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the entire state willing to keep enormous stacks of 
registration cards years longer than required by state law.72 
Third, the believability of Gold's testimony depends upon his 
connection with Klaus Fuchs, yet Fuchs twice failed to 
identify Gold when presented with his picture by FBI agent 
Robert Lamphere.73 Finally, Gold testified during the trial 
that he had been given a piece of onionskin paper by Yakovlev 
with Greenglass's New Mexico address and the words: 
"Recognition signal: I come from Julius." But, nine months 
earlier, during his preliminary interrogation by the FBI, 
Gold said that the message read "I come from Ben."74 Also, 
Fuchs often referred to himself as Julius, his middle name, 
and why would Yakovlev use someone's actual name when writing 
the recognition signa1175 This seems to be a tenuous link 
between the Rosenbergs and Harry Gold. Unfortunately, 
despite the feebleness of Gold's testimony, Bloch allowed it 
to go uncontestect.76 
The prosecution quickly began to wrap up its case 
against the Rosenbergs. The ninth day of the trial, Friday, 
March 16, was used to put two witnesses on the stand who 
could demonstrate that the Rosenbergs intended to leave the 
country and who attempted to undermine the character of Ethel 
and Julius. Dr. George Bernhardt, the Rosenberg family 
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physician and a family friend, reluctantly testified that, 
late in May 1950, Julius contacted his office to ask what 
types of inoculations would be needed to travel to Mexico. 
Bernhardt did recall Rosenberg mentioning that the 
information was for a friend of the family.77 William 
Danzinger, a friend of Morton Sobell since high school, was 
questioned on his efforts to assist Sobell while he was in 
Mexico. Danzinger had talked by phone with Sobell on June 
20, 1950, and remembered Sobell saying that he was going "on 
vacation to Mexico City."78 Additionally, Danzinger had 
agreed to forward mail from Sobell to his sister-in-law, 
Edith Levitav, and his uncle, Max Pasternak.79 During this 
time period, Danzinger had visited Julius Rosenberg on 
several occasions at his business, thus seeming to implicate 
Rosenberg in Sobell's flight from the country.SO The 
testimony of William Danzinger was especially damaging, 
because Sobell's actions demonstrated that he had something 
to hide, and Bloch's reluctance to cross-examine Danzinger 
further solidified the impression of guilt. 
The trial resumed on Tuesday, March 20. The court had 
not convened the day before so that Irving Saypol could 
attend his daughter's wedding. The prosecution presented the 
last of its witnesses. Saypol called Manuel Giner de Los 
Rios, an interior decorator who lived next door to Sobell in 
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Mexico City, and four other witnesses, all of whom testified 
that Sobell had lived under an assumed name while in 
Mexico.81 candler Cobb, director of New York City's 
Selective Service Board, was called to present Sobell's 
Selective Service file. This was used as evidence that he 
had used the name Sobell, and not an alias, while living in 
the United States.82 James s. Higgins of the FBI briefly 
testified to the circumstances surrounding the return of 
Sobell, contending that the Mexican police brought him back 
over the border to American officials.83 Finally, the 
prosecution called Elizabeth Terrill Bentley, a forty-four 
year old Vassar graduate who had been termed the "Red Spy 
Queen" by the popular media.84 Her presence in the courtroom 
confirmed the melodramatic nature of the trial and the fact 
that Communism was on trial, not the Rosenbergs. She 
described her history of involvement with the Communist Party 
and her many attempts at espionage. She mentioned Julius 
Rosenberg's name as one of many she had heard while involved 
with the Party, but later admitted that she was just 
repeating gossip she had heard at one point after his 
arrest.BS Bentley knew only of a mysterious "Julius" who had 
worked with the Party during 1942. Nevertheless, her 
testimony was accepted as convincing by members of the jury, 
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especially given the defense's inability to make inroads into 
her testimony. 
In light of the large number of witnesses and seemingly 
believable testimony provided for the prosecution, the 
defense was naive in its hope that its version of the truth 
would prevail. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were the only 
witnesses for the defense. They admitted to having extremely 
leftist, although not necessarily communist, political and 
economic beliefs.86 Additionally, both Julius and Ethel 
refused to answer more direct questions about their 
association with known supporters of the Communist Party, 
relying on the 5th Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Julius and Ethel denied all of the events 
described by Elitcher, the Greenglasses, and Gold. Julius 
testified that Ruth Greenglass had approached him, fearful 
that her husband was planning to steal something from the Los 
Alamos laboratory. But, despite their efforts, Saypol was 
able to create the impression that their unwillingness to 
answer certain questions was an admission of guilt, and the 
Rosenbergs failed to gain the sympathy of the jury as they 
had originally intended.87 Morton Sobell's unwillingness to 
testify on his own behalf, and Emanuel Bloch's constant 
objections to the use of the term "communist," also seemed to 
strengthen the assumption that the Rosenbergs were guilty. 
In their closing remarks, Bloch unconvincingly attempted to 
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portray his clients as innocent victims of majoritarian 
politics, whereas Chief Prosecutor Saypol effectively 
manipulated the strongly anti-Conununist sentiments of both 
the presiding judge and the jury. 
Despite the initial apprehensions of one juror, the jury 
handed over a unanimous verdict of guilty. Jury foreman 
Vincent Lebonite read the guilty verdict for all three 
defendants on March 29, 1951.88 The trial itself had 
lasted only fourteen days, despite the fact that this case 
was supposed to demonstrate the method by which the Soviet 
Union acquired the most destructive weapon ever built. The 
jury deliberated for only eight hours and forty-five minutes, 
having never consulted with Judge Kaufman about any 
particular court procedures or rules of evidence, and yet 
felt itself capable of handing over a verdict that could 
potentially result in the execution of three American 
citizens.89 Howard Becker, juror number three on the 
Rosenberg-Sobell jury, was later quoted during an interview 
as saying that he was confident in his decision, in large 
part because the jury had been reassured by Mr. Saypol, while 
in the judge ' s chambers, that the prosecution had not 
presented more than one quarter of the evidence that the 
United States had to use against the Rosenbergs.90 
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one week later, on April 5, 1951, Judge Kaufman 
sentenced Ethel and Julius Rosenberg to death in the electric 
chair, with a date of execution set for May 21, 1951. Morton 
Sobell was sentenced to thirty years in prison. David 
Greenglass, as a result of his confession and willingness to 
help prosecute the Rosenbergs, received a fifteen-year 
sentence on May 22. Yakovlev had escaped the country years 
earlier, and both Ruth Greenglass and Harry Gold had not been 
named in the indictment.91 
The guilty verdict and the imposition of the death 
sentence marked the beginning of a long and arduous process 
during which the lawyers for the Rosenbergs attempted to 
appeal the conviction. Judge Kaufman issued a stay of 
indefinite length, postponing the execution until these 
matters could be resolved. This appeals process achieved no 
concrete results. On January 10, 1952 1 the conviction of the 
Rosenbergs and Sobell was reviewed by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Second District. This three-person panel was 
composed of Thomas Swan, Harrie B. Chase, and Jerome N. 
Frank, all of whom were well-respected members of the legal 
community. Emanuel Bloch felt that their best chance of 
undoing the Kaufman decision was at the appellate court 
level, and he was allowed falsely to believe for the next six 
weeks that the Frank court would undo the Rosenbergs' 
conviction.92 On February 25, 1952, the conviction of the 
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Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell was affirmed. Justice Frank, 
despite having initially counseled Judge Kaufman against 
imposing the death sentence, wrote the opinion of the appeals 
court. Frank disagreed with and dissented on the Sobell 
conviction, but the court unanimously upheld the death 
sentence for the Rosenbergs. He noted that despite his 
apprehension over the severity of the sentence, he felt it 
improper for a higher court to overturn the decision of an 
inferior court based solely upon the justicesi feelings. The 
Frank court found no legal errors in the handling of the case 
at the district court leve1.93 Judge Frank held that even 
the harsh comments made by Judge Kaufman during the course of 
the trial constituted an acceptable standard of behavior. 
Frank's opinion left no doubt that he thought the Rosenbergs 
had already received their day in court.94 
On October 13, 1952, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a 
petition to review the Rosenberg-Sobell case, despite a 
recommendation made by Judge Frank that the case be reviewed 
at the Supreme Court level. Frank referenced Section 2206 of 
the United States Code, an obscure rule governing court 
procedure dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, as 
warranting review of the Kaufman ruling. This section of the 
u.s. Code allows both appellate courts and the Supreme Court 
to "affirm, modify ••• or reverse a judgment" in capital 
93 Walter and Miriam Schneir, Invitation to an Inquest (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
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cases.95. Frank thought that the Supreme Court would be best 
suited both to interpret Section 2206 and to decide the 
legitimacy of the sentence handed down by Kaufman. Judge 
Kaufman proceeded to fix a second date of execution for the 
week of January 12, 1953. Judge Kaufman then removed himself 
from the case, and was replaced by Judge Sylvester Ryan. 
Both a motion for a new trial based upon evidence of 
perjury and unfair practice, and a stay of execution, were 
reviewed by Judge Ryan on December 10, 1952. The attorneys 
for the Rosenbergs argued in their petition that both 
Saypol's conduct during the indictment of William Perl and 
the false testimony of Ben Schneider entitled their clients 
to a new trial. 96 Schneider had testified during the trial 
that the last time he had seen the Rosenbergs was in 1950, 
when they arrived at his photography shop. After the trial, 
however, Schneider admitted that he had been brought by FBI 
agents to Courtroom 110 on the day before he was to testify. 
Judge Ryan quickly disposed of both arguments, contending 
that Schneider had no apparent motive to lie, and that there 
was no proof that Saypol's actions influenced any of the 
jurors .97 
A clemency appeal was presented to President Truman on 
January 10, 1953, but was later passed to President 
Eisenhower as Truman left office on January 20. The clemency 
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petition had been accompanied by thousands of pleas for 
mercy, including one from Albert Einstein.98 Eisenhower 
refused clemency on February 11, 1953. His actions provoked 
a worldwide response. On April 16, the Osservatore Romano 
published a compelling editorial urging clemency for the 
Rosenbergs, and many other commentators, including the Paris 
newspaper Le Monde, urged Eisenhower to consider the severity 
of the sentence, especially in comparison to the sentences 
for Fuchs and May.99 Jean-Paul Sartre, writing in a June 
1953 article in Liberation which was later reprinted in the 
Daily Worker in the United States, called the impending 
execution of the Rosenbergs "a legal lynching which smears 
with blood a whole nation."100 Ronald Radosh and Joyce 
Milton described this outcry by the overseas media as 
creating a "headache" for Eisenhower, impacting Franco-
American relations.101 
Judge Kaufman again rescheduled the execution, setting 
the date for March 9. He knew that this provided Bloch with 
an insufficient amount of time to initiate an appeal before 
the U.S. Supreme Court. But Chief Judge Learned Hand of the 
Second District Court of Appeals granted a further stay of 
execution, arguing that he was horrified by the prospect that 
the judiciary was rushing two persons to their deaths.102 on 
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May 25, 1953, the Supreme Court rejected review for a second 
time, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.103 
On June 17, 1953, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas 
issued a stay of execution, holding that the petition filed 
by lawyers Fyke Farmer and Daniel Marshall as "next friend" 
of the Rosenbergs involved new and substantial questions that 
needed to be resolved by the Court.104 Farmer had first 
become interested in the plight of the Rosenbergs in 1952 
after reading a pamphlet distributed by Irwin Edelman, a 
former. Communist Party member and an organizer of the Los 
Angeles chapter of the National Committee to Secure Justice 
for the Rosenbergs. Farmer had been impressed by Edelman's 
argument that the Greenglass testimony was in serious error 
and that the conviction ought to be reversed on appea1.105 
But he had also been inspired to do some research of his own 
and proceeded to discover an argument that struck him as even 
more compelling: the Rosenbergs had been tried under the 
wrong law. In Farmer's opinion, the Espionage Act of 1917 
was no longer applicable to atomic energy secrets, because it 
had been superseded by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Under 
this statute, a sentence involving the death penalty could 
only be imposed by jury recommendation.106 
Farmer had been introduced to Emanuel Bloch on March 6, 
1953 for the purpose of presenting his argument to the 
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Rosenberg defense team. Bloch listened to Farmer for only 
thirty minutes, and his assistant, Gloria Agrin, seemed no 
more impressed than Bloch.107 Despite this setback, Edelman 
had found backing for Farmer among the ranks of the 
Committee's L.A.chapter. Among the supporters was Daniel 
Marshall, a prominent civil rights lawyer who had been 
serving as the chapter's legal adviser. Farmer and Marshall 
made a concerted effort to find a federal judge willing to 
review their argument. They arrived in New York City on the 
night of June 12, 1953 with a revised draft of their 
petition. The Rosenbergs were scheduled to be executed the 
next Thursday, June 18. They presented their petition to 
federal judge Edward Dimock, whom Farmer had known from 
meetings of the American Bar Association, but Dimock was 
unwilling to act on the petition, referring the lawyers to 
Kaufman.108 Kaufman was equally unwilling to listen to their 
argument. 
Farmer and Marshall, having failed in New York, hurried 
to Washington, D.C. in the hopes of finding a Supreme Court 
justice willing to lend an ear to their argument. They first 
knocked at the home of Justice Hugo Black in Alexandria, 
Virginia, assuming that he would be the most sympathetic to 
their petition. But there was no answer. unsure of their 
next move, they drove to the the Supreme Court building on 
the morning of Monday, June 15, 1953, to find the Rosenberg 
107 Radosh, 385. 
108 schneirs, 251. 
36 
defense lawyers already awaiting a hearing with Justice 
Jackson.109 Bloch was expecting the results of a last-minute 
petition, and ignored Farmer and Marshall as they walked into 
the office of the clerk.110 Introducing themselves as "next 
friends" of the Rosenbergs, Farmer and Marshall asked Harold 
Willey, the clerk of the court, if any other Supreme Court 
justices remained in the building. Willey entered their 
petition without the usual formalities, such as filing and 
docketing, and carried the paperwork to the office of Justice 
Douglas.111 They arrived at Justice Douglas's office at 11:30 
a.m., only to find two lawyers from the Department of Justice 
and James Kilsheimer, assistant to Chief Prosecutor Saypol, 
already present. They argued in front of Justice Douglas 
that the Rosenbergs had been tried under the wrong law. 
Douglas was impressed with the argument, surprised that it 
had not yet been forwarded during the appeals, and granted a 
stay until the Supreme Court could properly deal with the 
issue.112 
Through a rather unusual series of political maneuvers, 
Chief Justice Vinson called a special term of the U.S. 
Supreme Court on June 18, 1953, primarily at the request of 
Attorney General Brownell. The October 1952-53 term had 
concluded at noon on June 15, the previous Monday. Normally, 
the Supreme Court would have waited until October 1953 to 
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reconvene, but as Nat Hentoff has argued, Brownell was so 
intent on "obliterating" the Rosenbergs that their execution 
could not wait until October.113 The attempt to uphold the 
stay issued by Justice Douglas lost on a 5-3 vote; Justice 
Frankfurter abstained from the vote. The Court then 
attempted to shorten the stay by hearing further arguments 
and requesting additional briefs on the Atomic Energy Act 
within three weeks, but the move to allow additional 
argumentation only garnered four votes. Finally, Burton cast 
his vote with the majority when the first two motions failed, 
and the Court voted 6-3 to vacate Justice Douglas's stay of 
execution.114 The Supreme Court claimed a duty to see that 
the "punishments prescribed by the laws are enforced with a 
reasonable degree of promptness and certainty."115 
One final clemency appeal had been forwarded to 
President Eisenhower by the Rosenberg defense team, reaching 
his desk on June 19, the date now scheduled for the 
execution. Eisenhower and Emmet John Hughes, an assistant to 
the President, met with Attorney General Brownell. Brownell 
convinced them that a lot more evidence of the Rosenbergs' 
guilt existed, but that some of it was unusable due to legal 
technicalities. Thus, he convinced Eisenhower of the 
Rosenbergs' guilt using evidence inadmissible in a court of 
law.116 Murray Snyder, the White House press secretary, 
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issued a statement later that afternoon in which the 
President was quoted as saying, "I will not intervene in this 
matter."117 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were put to death by 
means of electrocution at 8:31 p.m. on June 19, 1953. The 
execution had been advanced by nearly three hours to avoid 
conflict with the Jewish Sabbath.118 The Rosenbergs were 
asked one more time if they wanted to confess to their 
crimes, thus allowing the court to reconsider their 
punishment, but the only voice heard was that of Rabbi Irving 
Koslow reading the Twenty-Third Psalm minutes before their 
death.119 
During the course of the trial and numerous appeals, a 
number of legal positions were forwarded that had little 
substantive value. For example, it was claimed that the 
sections of the Espionage Act under which the Rosenbergs had 
been charged should be declared void as an unconstitutional 
invasion of speech and the press. This type of argument was 
hardly going to succeed before the courts, especially given 
the political climate of the early 1950s.120 But there were 
at least six significant objections made by the Rosenberg 
lawyers that were neglected during the course of the 
proceedings. First, although the Rosenbergs had been 
officially charged with conspiracy to commit espionage, the 
charges against them were tantamount to treason. Convictions 
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for treason, under Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, require two witnesses of the same overt act who 
were not directly involved in the treasonous actions to 
confess in open court. The prosecution had not a single 
witness that met that description.121 Admittedly, the Soviet 
union had not been officially labeled as an "enemy" of the 
united States by 1945, a requirement for the charge to be 
classified as treason, but the court failed to address this 
issue, leaving room for doubt.122 Second, no one had ever 
been executed under the Espionage Act, and the accomplices of 
the Rosenbergs had received considerably lighter sentences or 
no sentence at all. This, it has been argued, constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the u.s. Constitution.123 
Third, it has been argued that the prosecution violated 
Chapter 18, Section 3432 of the Federal Criminal Code, which 
requires that a person charged with a capital offense be 
furnished with a list of all witnesses at least three days 
before the indictment. The name of Benjamin Schneider, the 
photographer whose testimony was critical to building the 
case that the Rosenbergs were planning to flee the country, 
was not on the list.124 Fourth, Judge Kaufman was openly 
hostile to the Rosenbergs. During the course of the trial, 
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he made numerous public statements concerning the severity of 
crimes of atomic espionage and his desire to see the 
Rosenbergs prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.125 
Fifth, it has been argued that Chief Prosecutor, Irving 
Saypol, deprived the Rosenbergs of a fair trial. Saypol's 
office, in the thick of the initial proceedings, declared 
during a news conference that they had arrested William Perl 
and that his testimony would corroborate that of Ruth 
Greenglass. It has been argued that this violated the 
Rosenbergs' Fifth Amendment right to due process of the law. 
All of these claims received little attention by either the 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court when 
it was considering the case for review.126 
Finally, it was argued that the indictment, trial, and 
sentence were secured under the wrong law. In 1946, Congress 
provided specific penalties for espionage activities relating 
to atomic energy secrets in the Atomic Energy Act. The 
statute allowed the death sentence to be imposed only when a 
jury so recommended. The Rosenbergs had been charged not 
with espionage, but conspiracy to commit espionage. The 
proof used by the prosecution for the charge of conspiracy 
extended far beyond August 1, 1946, the date on which the 
Atomic Energy Act went into effect. Had the government's 
case confined itself to those major acts of wartime espionage 
that it did prove, there would be no doubt that the Atomic 
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Energy Act would not apply. These overt acts occurred before 
1946, and no criminal statute can have retroactive 
application. But more than 35 percent of the testimony 
offered by the government dealt with events that took place 
after August 1, 1946.127 As Justice Frankfurter wrote in 
his dissenting opinion: 
The Government could of course have charged a conspiracy 
beginning in 1944 and ending on July 31, 1946, the day 
before the Atomic Energy Act came into effect. It did 
not do so. That fact is of decisive importance. The 
consequences of a conspiracy that was afoot for six 
years might have been vastly different from those of a 
conspiracy that terminated within two years, that is, by 
the time Congress devised legislation to protect atomic 
energy secrets.128 
Justices Frankfurter and Black also noted their uneasiness 
with the minimal amount of time dedicated to analyzing this 
important issue.129 It appears that a number of arguments of 
reasonable legal merit were neglected by one or more federal 
courts in an attempt to expedite the hearing. 
Three actors are most prominently cited as having 
willfully or unknowingly neglected due process of the law 
during the course of the Rosenberg trial. First, the 
government, in its prosecution of the case, acted unfairly in 
attempting to gain a conviction of the Rosenbergs. Attorney 
General Brownell of the United States, the adversary of the 
Rosenbergs in the case before the Supreme Court and a man 
publicly committed to the swift prosecution of convicted 
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spies, cooperated with Chief Justice Vinson in plotting 
against Justice Douglas and a possible warm response to the 
argument presented by Farmer and Marshall. An FBI memorandum 
dated June 17 was sent from supervisor D. M. Ladd in New York 
to FBI official A.H. Belmont in Washington, o.c. It 
confirmed that Justice Jackson arranged for these two men to 
meet behind closed doors and plan the special session of the 
court that occurred on June 1a.130 It had been planned on 
June 16 as a response to any stay or writ of habeas corpus 
granted by Douglas. Such actions violate Judicial Canon 17 
of the American Bar Association, a rule already in effect by 
June of 1953. The section on ex parte communication requires 
that a judge not permit private interviews or communications 
to influence judicial action.131 
Additionally, the team of prosecuting attorneys was 
particularly abusive in conducting its case against the 
Rosenbergs at the federal trial court level. The prosecution 
presented a list of over 100 potential witnesses, among whom 
were such eminent scientists as J. Robert Oppenheimer and 
Harold c. Urey.132 These individuals never testified nor 
were they even consulted about the possibility of testifying, 
yet the mere presence of their names on the list of witnesses 
added credibility to the prosecution's claim that David 
Greenglass had acquired knowledge of atomic energy secrets. 
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Ironically, Harold Urey later became a strong supporter of 
the movement to halt the Rosenberg execution.133 During the 
actual proceedings, the only person to verify the accuracy of 
the Greenglass testimony was another machinist at Los Alamos. 
Finally, the prosecution has been accused of having distorted 
the facts in attempting to win its case against the 
Rosenbergs. No one in the courtroom knew the difference 
between a fission and a fusion bomb, let alone the subtle 
differences between the particular parts of an atomic weapon. 
The prosecution misled the jury in convincing them that 
Greenglass's information was of any consequence. Most if not 
all of the information revealed by Greenglass had already 
been provided to the Russians by others, including Fuchs and 
May. Gerald Markowitz and Michael Meeropol argue that 
recently released FBI documents prove that the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the FBI knew before the trial that 
Greenglass's information was neither accurate nor 
significant. 
The released documents--even though heavily censored--
show that the FBI and the AEC knew in detail what 
material Klaus Fuchs had previously transmitted to the 
USSR, and thus knew that Greenglass' information was 
both inaccurate and insignificant.134 
Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the federal trial court has 
also been accused of improperly handling the Rosenberg case. 
Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter primarily blamed Kaufman 
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for the "less than dispassionate handling of the Rosenberg 
case." Writing to Judge Learned Hand in 1958, Frankfurter 
said of Kaufman, "I despise a judge who feels God told him to 
impose a death sentence."135 Kaufman did seem committed to a 
death sentence for the Rosenbergs. At one point in the 
trial, he responded to a juror's fears that a guilty sentence 
would result in the death of the Rosenbergs by telling the 
juror that the sentence itself was not an issue for the jury 
to consider, but that he wanted to take full responsibility 
for that task. Many have accused him of being so dedicated 
to a death sentence that he, behind closed doors, entered 
into contacts with the FBI so as to enhance the case against 
the Rosenbergs.136 His statements alone serve as more than 
convincing evidence of this self-imposed duty to punish the 
Rosenbergs. 
I consider your crime worse than murder •••• [I)n your 
case, I believe your conduct in putting into the hands 
of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best 
scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has 
already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression 
in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding fifty 
thousand and who knows but what millions more innocent 
people may pay the price of your treason.137 
Arguably, the party most guilty of sheer negligence was 
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court 
dealt with the questions before it so rapidly that the 
lawyers representing the Rosenbergs never had a chance to 
write or argue a brief on the key point of law that had just 
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been raised before Justice Douglas, and the validity of that 
point was never tested. A majority of the Supreme Court, in 
a period of less than twenty-four hours, not only considered 
themselves prepared to reject the validity of the point 
raised by Farmer and Marshall, but to go so far as to 
determine that their position was insubstantial and not 
worthy of the Court's attention.138 overemphasizing the 
potential for justice delayed, the Court neglected justice 
itself. Joseph Sharlitt writes, "The Supreme Court's extreme 
determination was the only way that the Rosenbergs could be 
put into the electric chair without further delay. And delay 
was, it seems, to be avoided at all costs."139 
The potential for the Rosenbergs to receive a fair and 
unbiased evaluation of their case by the Supreme Court was 
slim, because of the significant degree of animosity that 
existed between the judges. Justice Douglas, in granting the 
stay of execution, angered many members of the court. 
Douglas's earlier conduct in the Rosenberg case had so 
isolated him from his colleagues that even those who might 
have supported him on the legal merits of the argument at 
hand were deeply involved in personal disputes with him.140 
For example, just a few months earlier, Douglas had written a 
memorandum explaining his desire to review the Rosenberg-
Sobell case and condemning the Court for not managing the 
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four votes necessary to grant a writ of certiorari. His 
memorandum resulted in the necessary four votes after Justice 
Burton changed his mind, but Douglas then proceeded to repeal 
his memorandum, removing the incentive for the changed votes. 
The court never granted review. Vital votes were lost on 
June 18, not because the argument itself before the Court was 
wrong, but because Douglas had backed it.141 Sharlitt 
comments: 
It is a damning comment on the High Court's conduct 
during that week [June 13-19, 1951] that a legal point 
that had never before been raised, that should have 
spared the lives of the defendants, that was wholly 
correct even though scores of judges and lawyers had 
missed it entirely, was summarily brushed aside by the 
Supreme Court of the United States because of the 
personal pique of judge against judge. The animus was 
present.142 
Julius Rosenberg, while being housed in solitary 
confinement at Sing Sing, wrote to his wife, commenting on 
the motives for the conviction: "We have experienced 
unbelievable rottenness. There is a new whipping boy in our 
land 'The Rosenbergs' and all 'respectable' people have to 
cleanse themselves by throwing stones at us."143 It is 
undoubtedly true that the trial and execution of the 
Rosenbergs served as a symbol of the tensions that were 
prevalent in American society during the 1950s. Malcolm 
Sharp, attorney for the Rosenbergs, labeled his clients as 
sacrifices to the "fears and hatred" of a society engulfed in 
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the Korean war and the Cold war.144 Donald Pease described 
the status of American society during this time period: 
As the Cold war made the deployment of national military 
power against the Soviet Union an ever-present 
possibility, every American individual was definable as 
either an agent or an enemy of the state. The loss of 
the separation of realms led to the conscription of 
Americans' psychic lives for the internalization of an 
opposition, which in the years after World war II, 
settled over the entire globe, setting American freedom 
against the threat of Soviet totalitarianism. Fearful 
in their private lives of the enemy within, Americans 
scrutinized their psyches for signs of treason, 
subversion, or fanaticism embodied in the external world 
by the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss and Joseph McCarthy.145 
The 1950s were an era during which both members of the 
American judiciary and federal prosecutors were willing to 
risk their careers to satiate the demands of a nation 
consumed by anti-conununism. The Rosenbergs were not simply a 
symbol of this sentiment, but their trial and execution could 
be almost entirely explained by these feelings. Even if the 
Rosenbergs were guilty of everything with which they had been 
charged, their trial still amounted to nothing more than a 
modern day witch hunt. Joseph Sharlitt described the third 
week of June 1953 as the high point of McCarthyism. He 
argues that one cannot even begin to evaluate the execution 
of the Rosenbergs without knowing the "anti-red feeling" 
prevalent in American during the 1950s.146 It was impossible 
to separate these feelings from the trial. The only motive 
forwarded by the prosecution for the conspiracy was the 
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Rosenbergs' admiration for Communism and the Soviet union. 
The prosecuting attorneys made every attempt to put Communism 
on trial, rather than the Rosenbergs. The opening remarks of 
Chief Prosecutor Irving Saypol amounted to an accusation that 
the Rosenbergs were Communists. The defense responded with 
an objection that it was Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, not 
Communism, that was on trial, but Judge Kaufman not only 
allowed the statement, but informed the jury that it was the 
basis of the defendants' motive. Walter and Miriam Schneir 
claim that Communism and the trial were impossible to 
separate: 
Whatever the rationale, Communism was mentioned so often 
during the proceedings that at times it threatened to 
become a separate issue. In the violently anti-
communist political climate in which the trial was 
conducted, it is impossible to believe that the jury 
could have remained entirely objective toward the 
Rosenbergs and Sobel! in response to such 
testimony •••• 14 7 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists described the 
Rosenbergs as "martyrs for the Communist cause."148 
Many commentators have argued that not only did 
McCarthyism and anti-communism play an important role in the 
conviction and sentencing of the Rosenbergs, but anti-
Semitism was also a contributing factor. For example, Lucy 
Dawidowicz, writing at the height of the Rosenberg 
controversy, argued that the terms "Communist" and "Jew" 
became synonymous during the course of the trial, expressing 
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a fear that the execution of the Rosenbergs would set the 
stage for further atrocities of genocidal proportions against 
the Jewish conununity.149 This was a popular argument 
overseas, but the American media tended to reject anti-
semitism as a factor influencing the verdict.150 While it is 
true that many Jewish organizations protested the killing of 
the Rosenbergs and disturbing that not a single member of the 
twelve-person jury was Jewish, it is difficult to prove any 
type of solid correlation between a hatred of Jewish persons 
and the outcome of the case. Judge Kaufman, the 
Greenglasses, Morton Sobell and his attorneys, and two of the 
prosecuting attorneys were all of Jewish heritage. 
Additionally, many prominent Jewish organizations, including 
the American Jewish Conunittee, refused to support the 
clemency requests of the Rosenbergs, advocating the death 
penalty for convicted spies regardless of their cultural or 
religious background.151 Malcolm Sharp, in describing his 
inability effectively to reverse the Rosenbergs' conviction, 
admitted that the impact of anti-Semitism on the case was 
"negligible. 11 152 
Although most conunentators tend to reject the claim that 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed because of a general 
animosity toward Jews, two interesting and controversial 
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theories have been forwarded to explain a possible 
relationship between the cultural background of the 
Rosenbergs and the outcome of the case. First, Jewish Day, a 
New York weekly newspaper, published an editorial immediately 
after the sentencing of the Rosenbergs in which it was argued 
that the Rosenbergs may have been given a harsher punishment 
because Judge Kaufman suffered from a "Jewish complex."153 
The newspaper questioned whether Judge Kaufman may have 
sentenced Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death so as to avoid 
being criticized as lenient toward his fellow Jews. Vincent 
Lebonite, the foreman of the jury, described this feeling: "I 
felt good that this was strictly a Jewish show. It was Jew 
against Jew. It wasn't the Christians hanging the Jews." 
Given that the public assumed the guilt of the Rosenbergs, 
and that the trial was widely viewed as a Jewish affair, 
Kaufman may have feared a backlash against the Jewish 
community if he had been soft on convicted atomic spies.154 
Second, Judge Kaufman may have been angry because he feared 
the effect that the Rosenbergs' actions would have on the 
reputation of "respectable Jews."155 Judge Kaufman's wife's 
maiden name was Rosenberg, although she was of no relation to 
Julius and Ethel, and Kaufman may have been disturbed, 
because he perceived the guilt of the defendants as having a 
stigmatizing effect not only on his family, but on all 
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Jewish-Americans. Thus, this type of reverse anti-Semitism 
may explain why Jewish organizations and attorneys 
aggressively fought for both a guilty verdict and the 
execution of the Rosenbergs. 
In 1953, the world witnessed two American lives 
sacrificed to the politics of McCarthyism and an 
uncontrollable fear of Communism. Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg, despite a number of substantial and arguably valid 
legal defenses, were executed on June 19, 1953 for conspiring 
to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. The 
American legal system failed at all levels. Politics and 
hatred overwhelmed the ethics of federal prosecutors, the 
insight and impartiality of federal district judge Irving 
Kaufman, and the wisdom of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Justice Frankfurter was justifiably upset, viewing 
the Rosenberg case as "the most disturbing in his court 
career." 
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